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PROCEDURAL REFORM: ITS LIMITATIONS
AND ITS FUTURE*
CharlesAlan Wright**

T

HE invitation to come to the University of Georgia as a John A.
Sibley Lecturer in Law is a high honor and a great challenge. In
the three years this lectureship has been in existence it has moved to the
first rank among occasions of this kind about the country because of the
distinction of the people who have been previously called to this rostrum.' The lectureship has an added prestige because it is the Sibley
Lectureship. John A. Sibley's many contributions to the University of
Georgia Law School, and to his state, are a worthy example for those
who would follow him to the bar, and the trustees of the Loridans Foundation acted wisely in creating a lectureship named in his honor. Those
of us invited to take part in this series of lectures are challenged to say
something worthy of Mr. Sibley, and of the lectureship.
On such an occasion one would wish to make remarks that would be
profound and stimulating and exciting, but in this life we cannot all
be Wechslers or Kalvens, and each of us must fashion his own form of
intellectual tribute with such gifts as he has. Thus it seems to me appropriate that I turn my attention to that subject in which I have spent
most of my adult life and in which I am most deeply interested-the
subject of procedural reform. This is, I fear, a subject that many people
regard as extremely dull, but it seems to me a matter of very great importance, and it is the area of the law that I know best.
* This article was delivered April 4, 1967, as the third John A. Sibley Lecture in Law
of the 1966-67 academic year at the University of Georgia School of Law.
** Charles T. McCormick Professor of Law, The University of Texas. Member, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States; Associate Reporter, American Law Institute Study of the Division of
Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts.
1 Prior Sibley lecturers, in chronological order, have been Myres S. McDougal, Herbert
Wechsler, Sir Arthur L. Goodhart, Charles 0. Gregory, Mortimer M. Caplin, william L.
Cary, Hardy C. Dillard, Eugene V. Rostow, Harry Kalven, Monrad G. Paulsen.
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Procedural reform has become in recent years a far more fashionable
matter than it ever was before. My dear friend and former chief, the
late Judge Charles E. Clark, one of the great procedural reformers of
all time, said in an article published a few months before his death in
1963:
The growth of interest in problems of legal procedure and law
administration has been an outstanding phenomenon of the last
quarter century. Before that, only a few law schools and here and
there a courageous professional innovator had evinced interest in
how the courts performed in fact. Since then the subject has
become a major one for the schools, the bar associations, and the
courts themselves.

2

This is, I think, an entirely accurate appraisal. Never in our history
has there been as much interest as there is today in what was once
thought the drab and lowly subject of how the courts work. There is
ferment everywhere, and almost everywhere there has been solid accomplishment. The bar has made it its business to press for reform, in
sharp and welcome contrast to the situation in England a century ago,
when pressure from nonlawyers led to reform despite the opposition
of the legal profession.
It has been 29 years since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
adopted. They have twice been extensively revised, as new problems
presented themselves, and there have been other narrower amendments
of them. In those 29 years some 23 states, including Georgia, have
adopted new procedural rules or codes based closely on the federal
rules, and 10 other states have had complete, if less sweeping, revisions
of their procedure. Even in the states that have not made a complete
revision there has been change, as particular ideas have been incorporated into the local procedure. It is literally true that not a single
jurisdiction has been unaffected by the great movement that judge
Clark and his colleagues began three decades ago.
Reform has not been confined to the civil side of the docket. In the
federal system, and in a significant number of states, criminal procedure
has been and is being overhauled, although here it is hard for the
reformers to keep pace with the changes imposed on the states by the
Supreme Court of the United States. Reformers are turning their
attention, too, to the field of evidence, where reform has long been
2 Clark, The Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Rule-Making, 46
250 (1963).
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overdue. California, Kansas, and New Jersey have adoped evidence
codes and rules, and movement in that field is certain to gain much
momentum when rules of evidence for the federal courts, now in the
process of preparation, are put into effect.3
The mechanism for procedural change is now well developed.
Although in Georgia, as in a few other states, new codes have been
adopted by the legislature, the more common pattern has been to give
to the highest court power to make rules. The legislatures in a majority
of the states have followed the lead of Congress in delegating this power
to their courts. Grant of the rulemaking power presupposes that
expert advice will be provided to the courts, for they can hardly be
expected to make procedural changes entirely on their own. In some
states the advisory committees are well financed, while in others the
appropriation has been tiny or nonexistent, but this seems to make very
little difference in the end result. The lawyers and judges and professors who serve on these committees do so out of a sense of professional responsibility and dedication to the public interest. Where no
money has been provided to pay their travel expenses or to provide
needed research assistance, they bear the cost themselves.
The most complete machinery for procedural reform is in the federal
system, and it is right that this should be so, since the federal rules are
the model that every state considers, even if they do not always follow
them. The federal system has six advisory committees, charged with
recommending change in the areas of civil procedure, criminal procedure, admiralty, bankruptcy, appellate procedure, and evidence.
These committees report in turn to a Standing Committee on Practice
and Procedure. Eighty-five persons, representative of all branches of
the legal profession throughout the country, are members of the
advisory committees or the Standing Committee. Six law professors
serve as reporters for the advisory committees, and the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts furnishes valuable assistance. The
chairman of the Standing Committee, Judge Albert B. Maris of the
Third Circuit, has provided wise and effective leadership for all of these
committees, and they have been immeasurably helped by the keen
3

Much of the leadership in evidence reform has been provided by Professor Thomas

F. Green, Jr. of the University of Georgia Law School, who for more than a quarter of a

century has been pointing out the needs and the opportunities for improvement in the
law of evidence. See Green, The Admissibility of Evidence under the Federal Rules, 55
HARv. L. RFv. 197 (1941); Green, Federal Civil Procedure Rule 43(a), 5 VAD. I. REv. 560

(1952); Green, Drafting Uniform Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 Comu'ru. LQ. 177 (1967).
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interest in and support of their work by Chief Justice Warren. The
Chief Justice makes all appointments to the committees, and to the
extent that his schedule permits, he attends their meetings. The Supreme Court has ultimate responsibility to accept or reject the proposals of the committees, after they have first been considered by the
Judicial Conference of the United States, and the close attention the
Chief Justice gives to this work is not only an inspiration to the committees but also a help to the Court in making an informed judgment
on the recommendations the committees send to it.
With reform an accomplished fact in most of the country, with the
mechanism for reform standing ready to meet future challenges, it
would be easy to be complacent, and to assume that our courts are and
will be operating as efficiently as the wit of mart can devise. But amid
the general clamor of praise for the present system, there is an occasional discordant note. Professor Geoffrey Hazard observes that "a
sense of frustration seems to pervade attempts to deal with procedural
problems." 4 Judge Charles Breitel, of the New York Court of Appeals,
says:
[L]et us now look at what the lawyers call the adjective or procedural law-the law that governs the manner in which actions
and proceedings are brought, tried and concluded. In this field
there have been revisions too. There have been repeated recodifications. But is that procedure in harmony with the needs of a
modern society? The answer is a doleful no.,
These critics seem to me unduly harsh, but, as I shall develop later,
I have no doubt that there is more that needs to be done in improving
procedure. As I have reflected on their criticisms, however, I have
wondered if they have not asked more of procedure than can properly
be expected of it, and if they are aware of the limitations that inhibit
the freedom of the procedural reformer.
These limitations seem to me of considerable importance, for even if
Judge Breitel is wrong, and our procedures today do serve the needs
of society, it is obvious that the demands of society on the courts are
increasing very rapidly. If these increased demands are of a sort that
procedural reform cannot meet, then it is important that we recognize
this in advance and search for other cures.
4 HAZARD, RESEARCH IN CIVIL PROcEuRE 3 (1963).

5 Breitel, The Quandry in Litigation, 25 Mo. L. REV. 225, 227 (1960).
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It has been aptly said that "our courts are now confronted by the
mid-century law explosion." In part this is a function of an increased
population, and here the best estimates of what is to come are terrifying
in their implications. Today we are a country of about 200 million
people. By 1985, according to the experts, the population %illbe 266
million. For the year 2000 they predict 338 million people, and for 2010
they foresee 399 million. Thus in the lifetime of many of us the
population of the United States will double. If past experience is a
valid guide, the volume of court business will increase at a more
rapid rate than will the population. But the law explosion is not
caused by population increases alone. Professor Harry Jones is right
when he observes that
we have a society that is far more complex and vastly more demanding on law and legal institutions. New rights, like those of social
security, have been brought into being, and older rights of contract
and property made subject to government regulation and legal
control. New social interests are pressing for recognition in the
courts. Groups long inarticulate have found legal spokesmen
and are asserting grievances long unheard. Each of these developments has brought its additional grist to the mills of justice.7
The developments of which Professor Jones speaks are surely not
about to stop. These, coupled with the growth in population, suggest
an enormous increase in the amount of litigation. Already in many
places court congestion is exacting a terrible toll. The existing judicial
system cannot conceivably cope with the demands the future will make
upon it. The time to think about this, and to make plans to deal with
it, is now, not when the flood of new business has actually descended.
"....

[W]here change is revolutionary by reason of its speed and magni-

tude, anticipation is the only alternative to chaos.""
There are three ways by which we may deal with the law explosion.
One is to take certain kinds of matters out of the courts altogether by
providing other means for disposing of them. A second is to provide
more courts. The final possibility is to increase the efficiency of the
courts so that they can handle more business. This last possibility is
6 Jones, Introduction to THE CouRTs, "ue Punuc, AND Tm LAW E.x'sl-ION 2 (Jones ed.
1965).
7 Ibid.
8 Botein, The Future of the Judicial Process: Challenge and Response, 15 RrCORD Or
N.Y.C.BA. 152, 170 (1960).
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commonly thought of as the business of procedural reform. But my
unhappy conclusion is that it would be a mistake to expect procedural
reform to make a significant contribution to meeting the increased
volume of litigation. To understand this conclusion it is necessary to
understand the six limitations under which the procedural reformer
works. I shall speak primarily in terms of the federal system, and of
changes by rule of court, for it is this that I know best, but I think these
limitations are relevant also to reform in the states, and to change by
legislation.
LIMITATIONS ON REFORM

1. No Change in Substantive Rights
The first limitation is that changes in procedure must not affect substantive rights. This is always a restriction on reform by court rule, and
even legislative reforms may not alter substantive rights protected by
the Constitution. Thus many distinguished persons put the blame for
court congestion on the jury system, and call for abolition of the jury
in civil cases. I think Harry Kalven and his associates at Chicago have
demonstrated the unsoundness of this criticism of the jury system,9 but
even if it were sound, it would not be within the competence of the
existing machinery for procedural reform to make the change.
Nor is it within the jurisdiction of the reformer to take particular
classes of cases away from the courts entirely. In state courts, though
not in federal courts, domestic relations litigation consumes a substantial part of the time of the judges. It seems to me quite an inappropriate kind of work for courts. The law provides no meaningful standards for when a divorce should be allowed, or which parent should be
given custody of children, or whether an adoption should be permitted.
Nor do I think that being learned in the law, as our judges are, is as
useful training for resolving these matters as are other disciplines. But
it is not the business of procedural reform to make this determination,
and to set up other agencies to deal with domestic relations. There is
considerable interest at the present time in the Keeton-O'Connell
plan, ° and in similar proposals to take automobile accident cases partly
or wholly away from the courts and to provide some system similar to
workmen's compensation for the injuries. If such a change is to come
9 ZmSEL, KALVEN & Buotmouz,

DELAY IN THE COURT (1959).

10 KEETON & O'CONNELL, BASIc PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR

REFORMINc AuToMowIL

INSURANCE

(1965).
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to pass, it will have to be the work of someone other than the procedural reformers.
2. No Important Substantive Side Effects
The second limitation is closely related to the first, though it differs
in significant ways from it. Reformers ought not to propose changes,
even in matters that are clearly procedural, if these changes will have
important side effects on substantive rights. The first limitation, that
substantive rights not be changed directly, is a firm "Thou shalt not,"
stated in terms in the enabling acts delegating rulemaking power to
the courts. The second limitation, that substantive rights not be
changed indirectly, is more in the nature of a "Thou ought not," a
limitation the rulemakers should impose on themselves. Most people
would agree, I think, that substantive changes should come from the
legislature, and should represent a considered decision by that body.
This should be as true where the substantive change is the side effect of
a procedural reform as where it is made directly. I am not sure that our
reformers have always kept this principle in mind.
In the last few years some courts have adopted rules providing that
the issue of liability may be tried first in a negligence case, and a second
trial on damages is held only if plaintiff prevails on liability. This has
had marvelous results in terms of saving court time. A competent study
has been made of experience with such a procedure. That study concludes that cases handled in this fashion take 20 percent less time than
do cases tried routinely, with the liability and damage issues submitted
simultaneously to the jury." A saving of 20% in trial time of negligence cases would be an important gain for the courts. The same data
show, however, that while defendants win in 427 of the cases tried
routinely, they win in 79%o' of the cases in which the liability issue is
submitted alone.' This certainly suggests that juries are moved by
sympathy when they have heard evidence as to the extent of plaintiffs
injuries, and that this influences their decision on the liability issue.
Quite possibly this is a bad thing-certainly orthodox theory supposes
that it is. But when it is seen that the split trial reduces by more than
half the cases in which personal injury plaintiffs are successful, it is
apparent that the new procedure has made a substantial change in the
1. Zeisel & Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis. 76 HAv. L.
Rv. 1606, 1619 (1963).
12

Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and Proposed Remedies in Tim Courrs,
29, 49 (Jones ed. 1965).

THE PUBLIC, AND TH= LAW EXPLOSiON
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nature of jury trial itself. If this is to be done, and if the Constitution
permits it to be done, the change should come from those who are
elected to make laws, with full awareness of what they are doing. It
should not come under the guise of an attack on court congestion from
those of us who are mere technicians, whose function it is to make the
gears operate smoothly.
There are other procedural changes that I would feel obliged to
reject on similar grounds. Many persons have urged from time to time
that we should adopt the English system under which the losing party
must pay the expenses the lawsuit has caused his opponent, including
the lawyer's fee of the winner. I have no doubt that this is a substantial
deterrent to litigation, and that adoption of such a system would help
to reduce congestion in the courts. A fair argument can be made that a
rule to this effect "really regulates procedure,-the judicial process of
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of
them."'13 If this is so, then such a provision would be within the rulemaking power as the Supreme Court of the United States has defined
it. Indeed the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already contain provisions by which one party may, in certain narrow circumstances, be
required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to his opponent. 14 But even
if I were sure that such a rule is within the rulemaking power, and
more persuaded than I now am that it would be desirable, I could not
vote to recommend adoption of it by the Supreme Court. It seems to
me quite clear that the rule would have a very great substantive effect,
even if only indirectly. It would inhibit access to the courts by those
whose means are limited, while not affecting those who have ample
financial resources. Such class legislation is not the proper business of
procedural reform.
In a sense it is true that every procedural rule has consequences of a
substantive nature, for every such rule may affect the outcome in some
cases, and some of them are deliberately intended to alter the outcome
in many cases. When the discovery rules were adopted in 1938 they
were expected to "make a trial less a game of blindman's bluff and more
a fair contest."'15 This presupposed that they would change the results
in many cases. Every lawyer can think of cases that he won only because
of what he learned from discovery-or that he lost only because his
13 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
14 FED. R. CIV. PROC. 30(g), 37(a), 37(c).

15 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
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opponent had access to discovery. Yet I have no doubt that the adoption of these rules was a valid exercise of the rulemaking power. Although they affect the outcome of cases, they do so in a quite unpredictable fashion, and do not help or hurt any particular identifiable
class of litigants.
Although I insist on the importance of this second limitation, I must
confess that the line it draws is a hazy one, and that sometimes differences of degree may be decisive. When I was a member of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, I supported and voted for the amendment to
Rule 4(f), adopted in 1963, that in certain situations permits service of
process outside of the state but not more than 100 miles from the court.
I believe it would be desirable to have nationwide service of process in
all cases in federal courts. With modem methods of transportation it
is quicker and less burdensome to come from California to New York
to defend a lawsuit than it was to go from one town in Georgia to another when the Judiciary Act of 1789 was passed. I have no doubt whatever that the Supreme Court could make a rule providing for nationwide service of process. 16 But if a proposal to this effect were to come
to the Standing Committee, of which I am now a member, I should
want to think long and hard before deciding whether this is not so basic
an alteration in the way of doing things that the change should be made
by Congress rather than the Court.
3. Considerationsof Federalism
The third limitation on procedural reform applies only to the federal
courts and not to the states. It is that reformers must take into account
that ours is a federal system, and that they should not attempt to alter
by federal procedural rule those matters that are properly the concern
of the states. Necessarily I am led here to the great case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.'7 Until two years ago the Erie doctrine was of
little moment to federal rulemakers. We recommended the best rules
we could devise. If, in a particular case, the basis of jurisdiction was
such that the Erie doctrine applied and if the subject matter of our rule
was such that, on the test then in vogue, Erie required federal courts to
apply state law, then the court would simply look to the state rule,
rather than the federal rule, for that particular matter in that particular
case.' The federal rule would operate as designed in other cases in
16 Cf. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
17 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
IS E.g., Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
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which Erie was not controlling.'9 All of this was changed in 1965 by
the decision of Hanna v. Plumer.20 As I read the Hanna case, Erie has
no application if there is a valid federal rule covering a point. The considerations that underlie Erie are relevant in deterrhining if a rule is
valid, but once that determination has been made the rule can thereafter be applied in all cases, regardless of the basis of jurisdiction and
regardless of what the state law on the point may be. I welcome the
Hanna decision. I think it is analytically sound, and that it contributes
needed clarity and simplicity of application to what had been a very
confused area of the law. At the same time, however, I think Hanna
limits federal rulemakers and imposes a heavy burden on them. With
Hanna on the books it is now incumbent on the rulemakers to consider
the extent to which application of a proposed rule, in cases where state
law is different, is consistent with the proper ordering of our federal
system.
The area in which this limitation is currently oE greatest concern
is the formulation of rules of evidence for federal courts. The problem
can be seen most clearly, and is most difficult, with regard to the evidentiary privileges for confidential communications. Any rule a member of the Evidence Advisory Committee might propose in the area of
privilege would be inconsistent with the law in many states. The states
differ widely on which privileges they recognize, and on the scope of
and exceptions to the privileges. Yet the creation of these privileges
represents an attempt by the states to encourage relations that are
primarily of state, rather than federal, concern. On the classic analysis
of Wigmore, the existence of a privilege is justifiable only where confidentiality is essential to foster a relation society believes so important
that encouragement of the relation outweighs the need to have all
relevant evidence in determining the truth of a matter.2' Suppose that
a particular state makes this kind of choice and concludes, for example, that the sources of a newspaperman's information should be
privileged, hoping thereby to encourage confidential disclosure to
journalists, and thus a fully informed and crusading press. I would
think this an unwise choice, but clearly a choice it is within the competence of the state to make. The person who relies on this privilege,
and gives information in confidence to a newspaperman, will consider
19 E.g., Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1947), cited with approval in Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., supra note 18, at 533.
20 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
21 8 WIGMORE, EvIDFNcE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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himself unfairly used if his name should be made public because the
reporter is called as a witness in a suit in which the parties are citizens
of different states, and that therefore is brought in federal court. Fear
of this result may well deter him from making such disclosures, and
thus defeat the policy of the state. Of course there is very little evidence
that people consult the local law of privilege before making, or refraining from making, confidential communications. Indeed such evidence
as exists indicates that they do not 2 2 But the existence of privileges assumes that they do, and I think we must accept this assumption.
I believe that a federal rule denying a privilege where the state would
grant one would be a valid procedural rule, and that, under the Hanna
decision, it could be applied in any kind of case. For just that reason I
do not believe that the Supreme Court should adopt such a rule. State
policies of this kind should not be defeated by federal procedural rules.
My view would be different in a federal criminal case or in an action
to enforce federal laws. Even here there is an interference with state
policy, but here there is a countervailing federal interest in deciding for
itself what evidence should be admissible in actions to enforce its own
laws. But to fail to recognize a state-created privilege in a suit on a
state-created claim that is in federal court only because of the accident
of diversity of citizenship seems to me quite indefensible. Professor
Ronan E. Degnan, of the University of California, who has reached a
similar conclusion, suggests that the rulemakers should not adopt any
rules on privilege for state law cases, and should leave those questions
to be resolved by state law. 23 I would go somewhat farther than he does.
The interference with state policy that seems to me objectionable occurs only if the federal court fails to recognize a state-created privilege.
There is no similar interference if the federal court recognizes a privilege that the state would reject. Accordingly I see no problem if a
federal privilege is broader than the state privilege, but only if it is
narrower. The appropriate solution, I suggest, would be to provide in
the federal rules for those privileges thought justified, but then to have
a further provision, applicable to diversity cases only, making privileged
any other matter that would be privileged by applicable state law.
Here, as in all other areas of procedure where deference to state provisions seems indicated, I would hope that the states would study carefully the model of the federal provisions, and that they might in time
22 E.g., Hutchins g: Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Faminy
Relations, 13 MIzN. L. REv. 675, 682 (1929).
23 Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform. 76 HAiv. L. REv. 275 (1962).
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choose to alter their own statutes to bring them into conformity with
the federal rule. But this would be a voluntary choice by the state,
rather than an interference with the state by the federal rulemakers. To
borrow a phrase of Professor Degnan's, the implication of Hanna is not
that the federal rules are valid because wise men made them, but because wise men thought carefully before making them. Careful thought
to the presuppositions of federalism seems to me now essential in the
formulation of federal rules.
4. Conservatism of the Reformers
The three limitations on procedural reform I have so far described
are desirable limitations that ought to be maintained. The remaining
limitations of which I shall speak are of a different kind. They represent
the way procedural reform works in practice, as I have seen it, and not
necessarily the way it ought to work. The fourth limitation is the conservatism of the reformers themselves. Dean Charles W. Joiner of the
University of Michigan, who is a member of the federal advisory committees on both civil rules and rules of evidence, and who led the
reform of Michigan procedure, has said:
The third attitude essential for procedural appraisal is accented
in the words "No one wants to be a radical." Few lawyers wish to
be so characterized, yet procedure reform and honest appraisal
24
demand radicals.
Dean Joiner is right that few lawyers wish to be considered radicals, and
in my acquaintance with procedural reformers around the country I
know of very few radicals. The law is a conservative profession, accustomed to building slowly on the wisdom of the past rather than making a single bold leap. The lawyers who have distinguished themselves
sufficiently in the practice to be chosen for a leadership role in a reform
effort ordinarily exemplify this tradition. To a large extent this is a
healthy thing. Though I agree with Dean Joiner that a radical approach
is useful in appraising procedural institutions, a more cautious approach is the wiser course in changing those institutions. It is all very
well to sit in a committee room and to agree that a novel idea sounds
appealing, but hundreds of thousands of litigants will be affected, for
good or ill, if the change is put into effect. And so it is quite natural,
even desirable, that the reformer heed the ancient wisdom, better safe
than sorry.
24 Joiner, Lawyer Attitudes Toward Law and Procedural Reform, 50 JUDICATURE 23, 27
(1966).
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There are times when I have thought reformers were being unduly
cautious. But I will not cite examples, for I fully recognize that these
may be only my own predilections, and that what is too radical, or too
cautious, is always the other person's idea. The important point is this.
The changes in the demands on the courts will be radical. The response
of the procedural reformers is not likely to be. For this reason alone,
procedural reform is not going to be the answer to all future needs.
5. Need for Acceptance by the Profession
A fifth limitation on reform is the need to have professional acceptance of the proposals made. A major reason for the success of present
methods of procedural reform has been that the bar is given a full
opportunity to consider and to comment on proposed changes before
they are finally recommended. This does not amount to a referendum.
Comments on tentative drafts that come from lawyers, judges, or bar
groups are considered on the basis of their inherent persuasiveness. No
attempt is made to count noses. But it would be a mistake to impose on
the profession a procedure to which it has strong opposition, for the
rule will work only as those who must employ it want it to work. Let
me give one example. In a preliminary draft of proposed amendments
to the criminal rules, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules
suggested a revision of Criminal Rule 32 (c) (2) that would have made
it mandatory before sentencing a criminal defendant to disclose to the
defense the contents of the pre-sentence report, in which a probation
officer has set forth information he has found that may be useful to the
court in sentencing. 25 This proposal brought forth violent opposition
from some probation officers. An organized campaign was launched
against it. A survey was made of the views of federal judges, and the
great majority of them indicated that they did not approve the proposal.
As a result, the amendment, as finally recommended by the Standing
Committee and adopted by the Supreme Court, leaves it in the discretion of the judge in each particular case whether to disclose the presentence report. 26 I think this was the right thing to do, although on
the merits I would have preferred mandatory disclosure and consider
that the objections to the earlier draft were not well founded. It did not
seem wise to force on judges and probation officers a practice, however
sound, to which they had such strong opposition. I would expect that
the discretionary rule finally adopted will have a useful educational
25 SEcoND PRELLmARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED At.iEND timit

CEDURE 39-40 (March 1964 Draft).
26 FED. R. CRim. PRoc. 32(c)(2), as amended July
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1, 1966.
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effect, that judges will try disclosure in some cases and find that it works
well and that disclosure avoids sentencing on the basis of information
that may be erroneous. As they become familiar with the procedure and
see its advantages, their views about it will change, and in a few years it
should be possible to make disclosure mandatory, if indeed it has not
already become universal as a matter of practice.
As the example just described suggests, I think it better to make haste
slowly, and to give the profession rules it is willing to take and try to
work with, rather than rules that are simply imposed because the Supreme Court has the power to make them. But the need for professional
acceptance of change has a dampening effect on reform. I referred a
moment ago to the conservatism of the reformers. The reformers are
radicals, however, compared to the profession at large. It is a commonplace that "the rank and file of the bar will always work for the practice
it knows, will, indeed, view with suspicion, if not active dislike, a system
even in smooth operation next door across those imaginary, but sharp,
lines which divide states. Reform has always come, must always come,
from the students and leaders, not those whose horizons are limited by
their office walls or at most by the walls of the nearest courtroom. "27
The members of advisory committees are the leaders, not the rank and
file. They are likely already to be expert in procedure when they are
named to such a committee, and if they are not, their work on the committee will soon make them experts. They devote countless hours of
study to voluminous materials examining every aspect of a proposed
change. Because of the public responsibility that is theirs, they view
matters with detachment and concern for the interest of all litigants. It
has been very gratifying to see how, with very few exceptions, members
of these committees put aside at the door to the committee room the
interests of the particular kinds of clients they represent, and think
instead of what is good for all.
But when the proposals go forward to the bar they come to the attention of lawyers who are not expert, who can give the draft at best cursory study, if that, whose instinct is to oppose any change, and whose
immediate thought is likely to be in terms of how the changes would
affect their clients and their practice. I would like to give two illustrations of this reaction that do not concern procedural reform, strictly
speaking, but rather the related area of jurisdictional reform. The
American Law Institute is engaged, at the suggestion of Chief Justice
27 Clark & Wright, The Judicial Council and the Rule.Making Power: 4 Dissent and

a Protest,1 SYRCuSE L, Rzv. 346, 348 (1950).
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Warren, in a Study of the Division of Jurisdiction between State and
Federal Courts. The portion of the Study dealing with diversity jurisdiction has already been put in final form and published.2 It recommends a substantial curtailment of federal jurisdiction in diversity
cases. The diversity materials were completed before I became associated with the Study, I have no responsibility for them, and indeed my
reservations about some portions of those proposals are a matter of
public record.2 9 Thus I am not indulging merely in polite rhetoric
when I say that reasonable men may well differ about the desirability
of the proposals, and that some of the opposition to them has come from
able and intelligent lawyers who have fully studied what is proposed.
At the present moment, however, bar associations all over the country
are adopting resolutions condemning the diversity proposals. They are
doing so as the result of an organized campaign by a group of trial
lawyers that see in these proposals a threat to the privilege they now
have, in many cases, of choosing for themselves a state or a federal
forum on the basis of which is likely to give a higher verdict in a particular case. Most of the lawyers who have voted for such resolutions in
their local bar associations have never even seen the 216 page document
in which the ALI proposals are set out and explained, and have at best
read a summary of the proposals by the group that is seeking to defeat
them. This hardly seems to me a responsible way for the organized bar
to formulate its position on a matter of public importance, but I fear it
is not untypical.
My other illustration also concerns the diversity proposals. I attended
a meeting at which those proposals were debated by able spokesmen
for each side. That evening I was talking with a lawyer who had been
present. "Professor Wright," he said, "I'm for anything that will be
good for our courts, and improve the administration of justice, but that
proposal they were talking about this afternoon would cut my income
more than 50 percent." I can sympathize with his attitude. I am sure
that it would be difficult to persuade me that any reform that would
have so substantial an effect on my income was really an improvement
in the administration of justice. But it is forces such as these that make
the need for professional acceptance a significant limitation on what
can be accomplished by way of reform.
28 ALI STUDY OF =
DIVI ION OF JURISDIGrON BEVWEN STATE AND FEDERAL COUrs
(Offidal Draft Part I, 1965).
29 41 ALI PROc
ms 69, 72 (1964); Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73
YALE UJ. 7 n.* (1963). See also WRIGHT, FEDRAL COURTS § 23 (1963).
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6. Imperfect Nature of Our Knowledge
The sixth, and last, of the limitations on procedural reform is the
imperfect state of our knowledge. We know very little about how present procedures work. We know even less well what changes might
produce improvement in the future. If I had the power to put into
effect tomorrow any change in procedure I thought desirable, regardless of the other limitations, I would not know what to recommend to
meet future needs. There is much truth in Professor Hazard's remark
that "procedural scholarship is groping in a fog.' 30
Fortunately the fog is thinning behind us. Techniques have been devised, and are now being used, for empiric research on existing procedures. The most important research of this kind have been the Chicago
Jury Project, the study of automobile accidents costs and payments by
Professor Conard and his associates at the University of Michigan, and
the work of the Project for Effective Justice at Columbia University.
We can now make a better informed judgment as to present procedures
and past reforms. Unfortunately that judgment is not an encouraging
one. On the whole these studies show that past innovations, widely
hailed as offering a panacea for problems of court congestion, have not
worked that way at all. Professor Maurice Rosenberg of Columbia, who
was the head of the Project for Effective Justice there while it was making its studies of such highly-touted devices as the pre-trial conference,
use of masters, discovery, and adoption of a comparative negligence
rule, concludes that
there is no acceptable evidence that any remedy so far devised has
been efficacious to any substantial extent. Only a few of the new
measures have worked even to a modest extent, and some of them
have been positively counter-productive on the efficiency scale.81
This does not mean that the devices he studied are bad. Indeed his
studies, and others like them, provide evidence that such things as the
pre-trial conference and discovery do improve the quality of the trial
and thus, presumably, lead to better justice. Efficiency is a desirable
attribute of courts, but it is not the end for which they are created.
The techniques of empiric research recently developed have thinned
the fog behind us, but it remains as dense as ever straight ahead. In
this instance, that we now know something of where we have been is
little help in deciding where we should go. There is an almost total absence even of ideas as to possible future changes. The Federal Rules of
3o HAzARD, op. cit. supra note 4.
31 Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 55.
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Civil Procedure were themselves for the most part an adaptation of
ideas already well known. They combined features taken from the
Field Code of 1848, the English Judicature Act of 1873, and the Equity
Rules of 1912. But there were other contributions. The motion for
summary judgment had been known in English practice for 50 years,
and in New York for a shorter time, but the federal rules made this
device applicable to any party in any kind of suit. The highly popular
pre-trial conference was based on a practice tried out in a few large
cities shortly before the federal rules were drafted.
It may fairly be said that since the adoption of the civil rules there
has hardly been a significant new idea in the area of civil procedure.
Local rules for a split trial of liability and of damages, or for impartial
medical witnesses, perhaps qualify, although these only implement
powers plainly granted by the original rules, and are in any event of
doubtful wisdom. The one really important contribution over the past
29 years has been with regard to appeals. The late Judge John J. Parker,
of the Fourth Circuit, developed the very useful notions of hearing an
appeal on the original papers, rather than having them copied to make
up a "record," and of permitting the parties to print in seperate appendices to their briefs the portions of the proceedings below they wished
-the court to read, rather than printing the record below. These ideas
did reduce the expense of appeals, and the original papers method is
now universally used in federal courts, although the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules proposes to prohibit the seperate appendix
system. 32 With these few exceptions, there have been no new ideas in
procedure. The various amendments to the rules have been very useful,
but they are a polishing and a refining of concepts already in the rules
rather than significant innovations. Earlier I quoted Judge Breitel's
critical observation that procedure today is not in harmony with the
needs of a modern society. Let me quote him again:
There is a persisting fallacy that simplifying the language of
statutes, making them shorter rather than longer and reshuffling
their location, is procedural reform. It is not at all. At best it is
an improvement, and worthwhile only in facilitating the understanding and handling of existing procedural law. It does not
mark the kind of fundamental kind of procedural reform which
is needed. 33
32 Da.. ms oF PROPOSED Ru.E 30, UNIFoRM RuLES op FDERAL APPE.LLTE PROcEDuE 9.10

(Dec. 1966 Draft).
33 Breitel, supra note 5, at 237.
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But if, as I believe, we do not know what fundamental procedural reforms are needed, or are even conceivable, I do not think we can fairly
criticize the reformers for not making them.
THE FUTURE OF R-EFORM

By this point you must surely be ready to throw up your hands in
despair, and to abolish the elaborate machinery we have developed for
procedural reform. If the reformers do not know what to do, and are
so limited in what they can do, it hardly seems that they serve any useful function. But if I have persuaded you to such a view, I have gone
too far. I think procedural reform does have a valuable contribution
to make, and have intended only to be sure that you understand what
that contribution is, and that you do not expect from the reformers
more than they can provide. The problems of calendar congestion and
delay that lie in the future will not be met, in any significant way, by
changes in procedure. According to Professor Rosenberg,
systematic inquiry into how procedural .devices function in practice has disclosed time and again that their chief effect is not so
much to change the speed of the flow of cases through the courts
34
as to change their results.

If by procedural reform we can achieve better, juster results in litigation, then this is sufficient reward for the effort involved, even though
we must look elsewhere for cures for the law explosion.
1. Improve Understandingof Existing Procedures
Future procedural reform is likely to have three major functions.
The first is what Judge Breitel referred to unenthusiastically as "facilitating the understanding and handling of existing procedural law." 83
The amendment adopted last year to Rule 19, on compulsory joinder
of parties, is a good example of that kind of reform. The old rule could
not be read literally, and was not. It was symbolic only, serving to remind judges and lawyers that there are cases that cannot go on unless
certain persons are made parties. The rule, however, did not say what
these cases were, and so the reader was sent to the precedents and the
commentaries to find out how the doctrine works. The amended rule
recognizes candidly that the matter is in the discretion of the court, and
tells the court what factors to consider in exercising that discretion. The
84 Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 57.
35 Text accompanying note 33 supra.
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doctrine of compulsory joinder is understandable under the amended
rule. It was not under the former rule. This kind of change seems to
me worthwhile.
Or take the much-mooted question whether plaintiff is entitled to
find out, by discovery, how much insurance the defendant carries.
There are twenty-seven reported opinions from federal district courts
on this question, and the decisions are hopelessly split.30 There is no
appellate decision on the point, and probably no way to get one in the
federal system, although it has reached appellate courts in the states.
Surely this is a matter that should be settled, one way or the other, so
that every district judge in the country is not required to hear argument on the matter, research the question, and decide how he thinks
it ought to be resolved. Changes in the rules are needed, and will be
needed, to resolve issues like this on which the decisions are in conflict,
and to restate the intent of the rules where the courts have misconstrued
them.
2. Reexamine Belief in a Unitary Procedure
A second promising area for the reformers is to reexamine the belief
that all cases are to be handled by the same procedure. What we have
here is an overreaction to the sins of history. The forms of action were
an abomination, and separate courts of law and equity were a disgrace.
Thus every reformer, from the day of David Dudley Field to the present,
has worn emblazoned on his shield the bold motto, "there shall be one
form of action to be known as 'civil action.'" This is a splendid goal.
A major step toward achieving it was taken last year when suits in
admiralty were brought under the civil rules. But if the reformers
really believe that law suits are fungible, and that the procedures that
are good for one are good for all, then they have blinded themselves
to what all others know and understand. Surely it is true that "the
issue as to whether a group of mammoth corporations have conspired
on a national scale to restrain trade or to monopolize an industry and,
if so, what to do about it, cannot be handled by means of those rules
or techniques suitable for the trial of an issue of trespass upon land
or the breach of an employment contract."37 Much of the differentiation that different kinds of cases require-and are, in fact, given even
360
Those cases reported through September, 1966, are cited in 2A BAMxo.N & HoLorzoF,
FEDEAL PRAcrIC ArND'
PROcEDURE § 647.1 nn.45.5, 45.6 (Wright ed. 1961, Supp. 1966). There
are several later cases.
37 Botein, supra note 8, at 161.
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today-must come from an ad hoc tailoring of rules by a trial judge to
meet the needs of a particular case, but it is worth considering whether
some distinctions in the rules themselves might not be helpful, as was
done in a few respects when admiralty was brought within the umbrella
38
of "civil action."
In the same connection it would be useful to consider whether our
elaborate methods of factfinding are justifiable in every case. Professor
Benjamin Kaplan of Harvard, for six years the distinguished Reporter
for the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and now a member of that
committee, asks "are we in this country simply paying too much in
time, effort, and money to pursue the finer lineaments of truth which
must in any event elude us?" 39 It is a fair question. My present answer
would be that our use of "expensive and brittle tools to do a meticulous
job on the particular case" 40 is justifiable in some cases but not in all.
We would hardly wish to have an inquiry as exhaustive as that of the
Warren Commission to ascertain the true facts of every automobile
accident or even of every shooting, and indeed recent discussion of
the report of the Warren Commission suggests that the most careful
inquiry will leave some questions unanswered. Thus it seems possible
that there are some cases in which a simpler, possibly less precise,
method of factfinding than that now used by the courts would be
tolerable. It might be possible to identify those cases in which less refined factfinding techniques would be satisfactory, or perhaps, as I am
rather inclined to think, an optional procedure might be made available that the litigants could choose if they wished, and in return be
given benefits such as a high place on the calendar. In a sense this is
what is already done with applications for a preliminary injunction,
though the analogy, while suggestive, is of course not complete.
3. Adapt to Technological Change

The final area in which important reform may be expected is in
adapting to technological change. Within the last decade the computer
and the technique of xerography have had a revolutionary impact in
all other areas of life. The courts will have to take these into account,
as well as whatever other scientific wonders are to come in the future.
These technological developments have three implications for the re38 FED. R. CIV. PROC. 9(h).
39 Kaplan, Civil Procedure-Reflections on the Comparison of Systems, 9 BUFFALO L.
REV. 409, 421 (1960).
40 Id. at 426.
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formers. First, procedures must be altered to accommodate these new
devices. Here the concern must be largely with the rules of evidence
and of discovery. How does one discover facts buried in the magnetic
memory of a computer? What will happen to the so-called "best evidence" rule if machines in fact can make copies that are indistinguishable from the original? We need rules now to deal with problems such
as these.
Second, these marvelous tools must be put to use by the courts. I
was horrified by the suggestion of several experts at a conference last
month that "a computer could be used as a judge to hear minor violations such as traffic cases" and that it might replace judges for deciding
appeals. 41 Perhaps the day will come when a computer will have the
mental ability of a judge, but the computer, like the Tin Man in the
Wizard of Oz, -will always lack the most important ingredient of a judge,
a heart. There is no way to program into a computer the human understanding and compassion that are essential on the bench. We are
not, I think, willing to settle for what one computer expert has rightly
called " 'jukebox justice'-a justice of legal stereotypes more readily
42
machine retrievable."
In more humdrum ways, however, these modern devices can be of
real help to the courts. The computer could be invaluable in record
keeping.
Judicial records are still hand posted in bound ledgers, a method
more suited to the era of common law pleading-and of the horse
and buggy. Docket information is not organized in a way that is
useful or available to the judge-administrator. He cannot, for example, put his hands quickly on cases bogged down by lawyerinspired delay, or on cases that might quickly be settled if judicially
43
nudged.
Already there have been very promising results from the use of automated data processing systems for court docket control. 4" The new
41 N.Y. Times, March 22, 1967, p. 35, col. 1. See also Harris, Judicial Decision Making
and Computers, 12 Vx.,. L, REV. 272, 299-312 (1967); Boyle, Computer Axes Court Logjam,
TRL, June-July 1967 at 22.
42 Adams & Carabillo, Data Proceessing and the Law, 7 SDC MhACANE, Summer 1962,

P.3.
43 Halioran, Court Congestion, in ABA SprcuA
EVAL, CoMPTRS AND THE LAw 67 (1966).
REP,

Com.rtr= o.v Et.zcromlc DATA

44 Ellenbogen, Automation in the Courts, 50 A.B.A.J. 655 (1964); Space Age Electronics
Speed the Wheels of Justice, 48 J. Am,. JUD. Soc'y 37 (1964).
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methods of duplicating, inspired by the development of xerography,
are used by courts today, and the reformers should press for their increased use. Why should a printed record ever be necessary for appeal,
when at a fraction of the cost duplicates can be produced of the original
transcript? This procedure is now available in the Ninth Circuit, it is
used in some 95%o of the cases, and the judges of that court report that
they are greatly satisfied with it. I am disappointed that the Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules has taken such a negative view of this
45
procedure.
Let me give one final example of possible use of technological developments. Suppose that a jury is deliberating and it decides that it
cannot remember what a particular witness said on a critical point. The
jury comes back to the courtroom, the reporter is called in, he skips
through his notes, finds the right place, and then, in a dreadful monotone, reads to the jury the Q's and the A's. This seems a terribly oldfashioned method for a world that is quite accustomed in everything
else to the "instant replay." Would it not be perfectly feasible to have
a television recording, or even a sound recording, of what happens in
the courtroom? We have the machines. We ought at least to think about
whether they would be of help to our judicial system. 40
The third way in which the procedural reformer can take advantage
of technological developments is to assist him in his work. In part we
are already doing this. The empirical researches by the Columbia
Project and others would be quite unmanageable without modern
machines to extract the answers from great masses of raw data. But this
is not the only possibility. In the report of the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement there is a fascinating description of the use of a
computer to predict the effect particular reforms would have on delay
in a particular court. The computer is able to simulate the court
processing activity, and permits experimentation with court procedures. Thus the machine showed that if the District of Columbia had
had a second grand jury sitting during part of a particular period, the
delay between presentment and indictment would have been reduced
from thirty-five days to less than one day, at a cost of less than $50,000
per year for the additional grand jury and associated support resources.
45 DRAFTs OF PROPOSED RuLt

30, UNIFORM RULEs OF FEDERAL AIPELLATE PROCEDURE 10.

11 (Dec. 1966 Draft). The savings possible through such a method of reproducing the
record are persuasively described by Joiner, supra note 24, at 25.
46

"Videotape recording, television's familiar 'instant replay,' is being used to record

the interrogation of suspects by the Santa Barbara, California, Police Department," Kane,
Videotape Recording,50 JUDIMATURE 272 (1967).
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Similar information wa produced on such other matters as the effec
on delay of requiring all motions to be filed and heard within 17 days,
and the impact on time in the court system that possible reductions of
the percentage of guilty pleas would have. The commission concluded
generally that "simulation has been found an effective tool for examining reallocation of existing resources or efficient allocation of additional
resources." 47 At present the reformer can at best make a guess about
the effect of the changes he proposes. To the extent that tie computer
can make that guess more informed, it will be an invaluable aid to
reform.
So, as you see, I think there isstill plenty of work for the reformers,
even though I do not think they will provide a solution to the challenge
of court congestion threatened by the law explosion. For that latter
solution, we must look elsewhere. Perhaps drastic changes in substantive law must be made to take certain kinds of business away from the
courts. Or perhaps we shall simply have to double or triple the number
of courts. As our population increases in the future, we are not likely
to keep the same number of schools we presently have and simply make
them more efficient. Nor are we likely to keep the same number of
churches and hospitals, while we demand that they take care of peoples'
souls or bodies twice as speedily. We are going to build more buildings,
and train more teachers and ministers and doctors. If society is prepared to provide more of every other kind of facility and kind of professional that it thinks important ir order to meet the needs of a doubled
population, why is the thought of more courthouses and more judges
regarded as unthinkable?
7 PRESMDNT'S CoR0
CHENGE OF Ci

.MION ON LAw ENTORCEMNT AN) AD,'uNsrnoN or JusTicE, Tux

IN A FRE Socirry 257-59 (1967).
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